Departamento de Estudios Económicos, febrero de 2001. This study focuses on the characterization of the Mexican Power model with a more relaxed federal regulation under the new competitive law, greater trade liberalization and the emergence of competitive energy power markets in Mexico. It examines the influences of the foundation and subsequent development of the Mexican competition policy in the energy power sector. I argue that the creation of a competition policy was a fundamental issue to attain in order to complement the economic liberal model prescribed by international creditors and financial organisms, initiated in the 1980’s. This essay also discusses Mexico’s economic institutions and background on competition; Mexico’s Energy Institution’s, and the new frame-work of economic policy in the Mexican Energy Sector, particularly the Power sector, and tries to identify the expected roles of the market entrants and the government agencies. In a simple game theoretic model the regulator’s objective is to put into effect a system of open access and trade liberalization in the power market, while the national utility wants to keep the share of the market. An ideal combination should be bargained, taking into consideration the institutional characteristics of the sector.